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Abstract 
This paper interrogates the potency of sanctions as US and UN instrument for de nuclearising DPRK 
and the intervening variables thereof. With the aid of secondary methods of data gathering, content 
analysis, and rational action theory as framework of analysis, the paper observes that sanctions failed 
to actualize US and UN goals in denuclearising DPRK. It further observes that this failure is attributed 
to the absence of most of sanctions enhancing factors in the international system such as weak 
economy and political instability, quick imposition with decisive maximal impact, and active 
participation in liberalized trade, tacit coordination of enforcement, of sanctions with manifest political 
appetite to enforce penalties, lack of capacity to circumvent sanctions, avoiding an overuse of 
sanctions, weak offshore capital, and immobility of target assets. Therefore, this paper recommends 
objective international engagement and integration of DPRK as a nuclear state. 
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1. Introduction 
The nature of emergence of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), i.e., North Korea in 1948 
defines it nuclear programme and success in spite of numerous international sanctions. DPRK emerged 
as an extreme self-reliant hermit kingdom, isolationist, and socialist state with strict dictatorship out of 
the struggle between US allies (capitalist enclave) and that of former Soviet Union (socialist enclave) 
for the control of the Korean peninsula. State power is concentrated in the hands of the military, which 
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from the emergence of DPRK has the priority of acquiring assured national security in the midst of 
powerful multilateral threats. As posited by Mearsheimer (2003), they want to maximize their power as 
a guarantee for long-term security, and attain a nuclear deterrent posture against the US and allies 
(Sagan, 1996, p. 97; Pritchard, 2007). The same view was expressed by Pinkston (2003) in the 
following manner: 
“The bitter history of colonialism and war and the lack of confidence in Pyongyang’s security alliances 
partners have driven the North Korean leadership to allocate a tremendous number of resources to its 
missile program” (p. 11). 
The United States military capabilities and international behaviours are the “central nervous system” of 
this threat. Precisely, the US nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War 11, 
USrole in the1950s Korean War (Scobell & Sanford, 2007), and the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union—DPRK’s major ally, laid the background for these threats. However, General Douglas 
MacArthur of US threat to use nuclear weapons against North Korea during the 1950s Korean War 
prompted Kim Il-Sung—the founding father of DPRK—to practically embark on the development of 
nuclear weapons as deterrence and/or for security reasons. This view was validated by DPRK’s 
ambassador to the United Nations, Se Pyong, who stated that “If the United States continues, then we 
have to make the counter-measures also. So we have to develop and we have to make more 
deterrence—nuclear deterrence” (Al Jazeera, 2016). 
Thus, President George Bush’s doctrine of unilateral pursuit of US critical national security interests 
through the spread of democratic values; and his preparedness to wage preventive wars (Jervis, 2005; 
BBC News, 2006) as seen in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya; the administration’s declaration of North 
Korea as “axis of evil” in the January 2002 State of the Union address, and categorisation of DPRK as 
a threat to America’s national security (Arkin, 2002); the U.S. crack down on the Macau-based 
Banco-Delta Asia due to its alleged money laundering and counterfeiting; US freezing of moratorium 
on missile and nuclear weapons development programmes, and the United States reckless imposition of 
financial sanctions against DPRK exacerbated the perceived threat. These are responsible for DPRK’s 
ambition and success in developing nuclear weapons capabilities. 
Consequently, they announced its intent to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
on 13 June, 1994 and subsequently withdrew in 2003. The country intensified her nuclear weapons and 
missile development programmes, which eventually led to DPRK’s conducting of her first nuclear 
missile test on October 9, 2006. This development attracted serious condemnation and international 
pressure led by the US and with the United Nations as a willing instrument that culminated in multiple 
multilateral negotiations and imposition of international sanctions aimed at slowing down the nuclear 
programme and coercing Pyongyang into a negotiated reversal of the programme (Kim, 2014). On one 
part, the US and its allies prominently Japan and South Korea imposed multiple bilateral sanctions on 
DPRK, while international sanctions form the other part. 
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The goals or purposes of the multiple bilateral sanctions are broader than the international sanctions, 
which is associated with the nuclear and missile programs. South Korea imposes its own sanctions 
primarily to punish DPRK for its military actions, Japan’s case is to punish the country for cases of 
abductions, while the US raises human rights violations and trade in illicit goods as reasons. The policy 
objective of the multilateral or international sanctions pursues a verifiable nuclear disarmament and 
cessation of all efforts to procure nuclear weapons. In addition, the US wants to know the actual status 
of the nuclear weapons and the forms of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, and to establish an 
inspection regime to determine the baseline and ensure compliance. 
The United States began to impose sanctions on DPRK from March 6, 1992 when it sanctioned 
Lyongaksan Machineries and Equipment Export Corporation and Changgwang Sinyong Corporation 
for missile proliferation activities. Subsequently, other sanctions followed. These include 23 June, 1992 
“missile sanctions”; 24 May, 1996 sanction for missile technology-related transfers; 6 August, 1997 
sanction for unspecified missile-proliferation activities; 17 April, 1998 sanction for transfer of missile 
technology and components to Pakistan; 6 April, 2000, 2 January, 2001 and 26 June, 2001 sanctions 
against Changgwang Sinyong Corporation for proliferating MTCR Category I items; 16 August, 2002 
sanctions against Changgwang Sinyong Corporation of DPRK and the DPRK’s government for 
transferring missile technology to Yemen; 24 March, 2003 against Changgwang Sinyong Corporation 
of North Korea for transferring missile technology to Pakistan; 29 June, 2005 sanction and assets froze 
of three North Korean entities “responsible for WMD and missile programs; 21 October, 2005 sanction 
against 8 DPRK for proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or related delivery 
vehicles; and 30 March, 2006 punishment of a Swiss and US companies for procuring “goods with 
weapons-related applications” for DPRK (Blix, 2017) among others. United States allies such as Japan, 
Australia among others joined the sanction regime after the 2006 DPRK nuclear weapon’s test. 
Subsequent multilateral and bilateral negotiations on stopping DPRK from acquiring nuclear weapons 
and missiles led to series of United Nations Security Council Resolutions that impose severe sanctions 
on DPRK between 2006 and 2017. These sanctions include UNSC 1695 of July 2006, UNSC 1718 of 
October 2006, UNSC 1874 of June 2009, UNSC 2094 of February 2013, UNSC 2270 of March 2016, 
UNSC 2321 of December 2016 (Haggard & Noland, 2017), and the UNSC 2371 of August 5, 2017 that 
imposed additional sanctions, including a complete ban on the export of coal, iron, seafood and lead. 
These sanctions regime “were accompanied by other forms of collective enforcement. Inspection and 
interdiction activities were conducted not only under the aegis of the UN resolutions but through the 
US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as well” (Haggard, 2016, p. 945). The primary objectives 
of these sanctions and enforcement mechanisms are to prevent nuclear and missiles related items, 
materials, goods and technology export to DPRK, prevent the provision of conventional arms, nuclear 
technology and training to North Korea. They seek also to prevent the procurement of such items from 
DPRK and the transfer of fund to aid the weapons programmes. Consequently, the sanctions regime 
target DPRK’s international financial flows, third-country brokers, and financial enablers of the nuclear 
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programs. 
However, in spite of all these multilateral and bilateral sanctions, a total of 21 missiles were advertised, 
tested, and/or launched in 2016 alone on 14 different occasions DPRK. Pyongyang celebrated the 
success of majority of these launch, which international observers equally acknowledged as successful. 
These weapons include the Hwasong-6, Nodong, Musudan, Taepodong and Pukkuksong-1, which are 
medium—and long-range missiles (Macias, 2016). Advancing these tests, DPRK successfully launched 
a ballistic missile—the Pukguksong-2—on February 12, 2017. Further, four ballistic missiles were also 
launched on March 6, 2017; others were tested on April 5, 2017; April 16, 2017; May 14, 2017 testing 
of an intermediate-range ballistic missile known as Hwasong-12; July 3, 3017 testing of an ICBM 
known as Hwasong-14; August 25, 2017 testing of 3 short-range ballistic missiles; August 28, 2017 test 
of Hwasong-12 missile; and September 3, 2017 testing of a hydrogen bomb. Significantly, each of 
these tests is more sophisticated and advanced than the former.  
Thus, the efficacy of sanctions as instrument of interest actualization in the international system is 
highly disputed even among scholars. Many argue and research findings equally suggest that 
imposition of sanctions do not orchestrate behaviour change on the recipient actor or state (Martin, 
1992; Morgan, 1994; Pape, 1998) but led to the actor’s establishment or formation of new alignment or 
bilateral relations with other actors that did not support the sanctions (Escribà-Folch, 2012; Oechslin, 
2014; Morgan, 2015; Huish, 2017). 
With a sample of 116 case studies extracted from international activities between World War I and the 
1990 UN embargo of Iraq, Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (1990) found that sanctions have poor track 
record of initiating or enforcing behaviour change among actors in the international system. These 
scholars argue that the efficaciousness of sanctions in achieving behaviour modification or change 
depends on the following factors: the relative modesty of the goals of the sanctions, when the sanction 
recipient is smaller than its protagonists, faced with weak economy and political instability, where 
pre-sanction bilateral relations exist between the two parties, if the sanctions are imposed quickly and 
decisively to maximize impact, and where the protagonist avoids high costs to itself (Ruediger, 2006). 
Thus, the success of sanction is rare and/or very little (Cortright & Lopez, 1995). 
However, dominant position in the literature argues that sanction is an important instrument in 
enforcing behaviour change among actors in the international system (Giumelli & Ivan, 2013; Peterson, 
2013; Lehne, 2013; de Vries & Hazelzet, 2005; Cortright & Lopez, 2000; Pape, 1997; Galtung, 1967) 
but certain conditions are needed for its effectiveness (Huish, 2017). These conditions include the 
sanction recipient must be an active participant in the liberalized international trade (van Bergeijk, 
2009), the protagonists of the sanction must exhibit political appetite or will to enforce penalties (Bapat 
& Kwon, 2015; Huish, 2017), there should be lack of personal capacity on the part of the recipient 
government to circumvent the sanctions (Hufbauer & Oegg, 2000), sanctions target and inflict damages 
to the ruling elites and their hostile programmes or projects (Drury, 2001; Tostensen & Bull, 2002; 
Gordon, 2011), checkmating or avoiding the overuse, abuse, and/or misuse of sanctions as foreign 
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policy instrument of a particular state (Eckert, 2008), none availability or weak offshore capital 
(Hampton & Christensen, 2002), and where the recipient state is unable to move assets to safe location 
in time (Lopez & Cortright, 1997).  
Consequently, this paper seeks answers to the following questions: 
1) Were international sanctions potent in securing US and UN interest over DPRK’s nuclear weapons 
development? 
2) What are the factors that limited the efficaciousness of international sanctions against DPRK’s 
nuclear programmes? 
 
2. Materials and Methods 
Considering the avalanche of literature and/or empirical studies available on international sanctions 
against DPRK against its nuclear programmes and the development of the programmes and its 
economy in spite of sanctions, this paper adopts the secondary method of data collection. In this 
method, accessible books, journals, conference/seminal papers, workshop and lecture papers, 
magazines and newspapers are the primary sources of data. Relevant publications from these sources 
were read and their findings extrapolated as data.  
The data thereafter was analysed using content analysis. In the analysis, the consistency of opinion in 
each work was verified and evaluated in the light of other findings made by different scholars to 
establish their reliability. These findingshaving stood the test of timevalidate the pieces of information 
contained in this paper. The sources of these data are thoroughly referenced. 
To explain inter-variables relations in a framework that enhances objective inferences, this paper adopts 
therational action model/theory for its analysis. The theory holds that states are rational actors whose 
behaviours are rational options. Their behaviours balance “costs against benefits” in pursuit of maximal 
“personal advantage” (Friedman, 1953, p. 22). According to Elster (1986), Roemer (1988), and Wright 
(1989), individual state actors are motivated by the goals that express their “preferences”. In this, they 
anticipate the outcomes of alternative courses of action and envisage the best cost-effective course of 
action that yields maximum advantage. Thus, such state actor rationally chooses the alternative that is 
likely to give them the greatest satisfaction (Heath, 1976; Carling, 1992).  
Therefore the basic assumption of the theory is that the patterns of behaviour in the international 
system reflect the choices made by states in pursuit of benefits maximization with minimal costs. It 
entails choosing a “rational” action given one’s preferences, the actions one could take and the 
expectations therein.  
This paper considers the theory relevant in spite of its weaknesses such as its disregard for the role of 
uncertainty, assumption ofactor’s complete knowledge of other contending actors, and the assumptions 
of actor’s full knowledge of environmental implications and different limitations affecting its rational 
capacities. Its relevance lies in its ability to highlight the place of (national) interests as drivers of states 
choices. In this case US/UN pursuit of denuclearizing DPRK and their pursuit of nuclear programme. 
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Equally, it enables this research to isolate specific rational choices made by US/UN, i.e., international 
sanctions, examine their costs and benefits, and therefrom assess the potency of the choices. The theory 
enables this paper to assess the role of the weaknesses of the theory on the failure of US/UN sanctions 
to abort DPRK’s nuclear programmes. 
 
3. Data Presentation and Analysis 
This section investigates the nature and level of DPRK’s external trade relations during the sanctions 
regime with a view to establish the impact of the regime. As reflected in Table 1, Japan is the only 
country that stopped all forms of exports to DPRK due to the sanctions. As a consequence, many other 
countries such as India, Italy, Sri Lanka, and Russia embarked on expanded and/or comprehensive 
export services during the sanctions regime to DPRK. The products, which they export to DPRK 
include among others: x-ray related equipment, nickel alloys, light oil, aircraft, platinized catalysts, 
explosives, filtering or purifying machineries possibly including centrifuges, vacuum pumps, data 
processing machines, and transmission apparatus. These led to a tremendous increase in DPRK’s 
volume of international trade during the sanctions regime. 
In addition to this, the report of International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (2013, p. 1) observe 
that “Sanctions clearly have not stopped North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, but the sanctions 
have made it more difficult for North Korea to acquire goods for these programmes”. Similarly, Choi, 
and Bae (2016) summarised the impact of sanctions on DPRK as follows: 
“However, far from resolving the standoff with the North (Haggard & Noland, 2012), sanctions have 
made the situation worse. North Korea’s ability to sustain its nuclear weapons program does not seem 
to be weakened and its regime remained intact even as it increased its nuclear and ballistic missile 
technologies” (p. 820). 
This observation is supported by over 40 interception cases and consequent successful interdictions 
against DPRK’s exports, and the various DPRK’s launch and tests of high tech and advanced nuclear 
weapons such hydrogen bomb, Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, etc. 
DPRK’s successful defiance of international sanctions has been attributed to a number of factors. This 
include DPRK’s evasions of sanctions through the “use of legitimate trade as a cover” up for 
sanctioned goods, the “use of multiple layers of intermediaries, shell companies and financial 
institutions” (IISS, 2013, p. 2), falsification of Cargo documentations and the use of legitimate 
shipping/courier companies and multiple ports for shipments, hidden trade relations, money laundering 
and other illicit activities.  
Similar to this factor, poor and insufficient knowledge of DPRK’s sources of nuclear technology, 
nuclear materials, and financing limits the impact of the sanctions on the development of the weapons 
programmes. Thus, United States and its allies could cause delays, create financial discomfort and 
harass the DPEK’s efforts, but cannot abort programmes that are opaque to Western intelligence and 
enjoys limited outside support. As an addendum to this, the some members of the UNSC that are part of 
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the group that impose sanctions on DPRK are responsible for advancing the nuclear and missile 
development programmes. For instance, technological transfer from the Soviet Union and China’s 
assistance led to the development of Nodong (Cordesman et al., 2011). Similarly, DPRK’s initiation 
and development of indigenous intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), the Taepodong-1 and the 
Taepodong-2 was facilitated and assisted by Chinese and Russian engineers. 
In addition, DPRK does not produce luxury goods that are of interests to the protagonists of the 
sanctions regime. Similar to this, Table 1 reveals that there are no close trade ties between DPRK and 
these countries that are at the vanguard of the sanctions such as the United States, European Union, 
Japan, and South Korea, etc. Countries at the vanguard of the sanctions against DPRK either have 
negligible economic and trade exchange with or significantly reduced their exchange as a result of 
bilateral or secondary sanctions since the early 1950s. For instance the United States has little or 
nothing to cut-off again from DPRK, while South Korea and Japan are increasingly facing similar 
experiences since the contemporary nuclear stand-off. Therefore, their prohibition of exports to DPRK 
could not alter their trade equation. DPRK has being heavily dependent on inputs from the Soviet 
Union, trade with the Eastern bloc countries, and with other socialist states across the world. 
Very important to note is the fact that Offshore Ownership and Weak Oversight of Maritime 
contributed to the failure of international sanctions against DPRK. Most of the vessels are owned, 
registered, and managed by companies based in Hong Kong, Bahamas, Singapore, and Pyongyang, etc., 
in offshore locations with the assistance of third-party intermediaries. This made it impossible for the 
US and its allies and the UN to enforcement DPRK’s sanctions. The Offshore business is a closed one 
where it is impossible for the US, UN and others to identify their stakeholders, boards of directors, and 
intermediaries for punishment due to sanctions violation. DPRK maintains substantial offshore capital 
and links, which makes it impossible to stop their international transactions. 
Complementing these factors, the prevalence of “weak links” and coordination problems among 
sovereign states who are members of the UN and UNSC advancing the sanctions regime hindered or 
obstructed the imposition of a robust sanctions regime on DPRK. For instance, Russia and China have 
always blocked such proposals, while they remain DPRK’s major trading partners (Haggard, 2016; 
Hufbauer et al., 2007). Further, China is always playing a patronage role to DPRK in the international 
system because it has continued to provide the leeway for DPRK amidst of sanctions. China remains 
the life wire of DPRK’s economy. Grieger (2016) observed it thus: 
“China has huge economic leverage over North Korea, since it is the country’s largest trading partner. 
In 2014, the volume of Sino-North Korean trade reached US$6.9 billion, up from US$1.7 billion in 
2006 when the first UN sanctions were adopted. China has largely profited from North Korea’s 
increasing economic isolation by monopolising trade with the country, resulting in the latter’s reliance 
on trade with China growing to 90.1% by 2014. China provides North Korea an estimated 40% of its 
food, 70% of its crude oil, 95% of its foreign direct investment and a huge amount of foreign aid” (p. 
6). 
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In addition, there are evidences that DPRK acquired enough stockpile of nuclear materials prior to their 
first nuclear test, which enables them to advance in the nuclear weapons development in spite of 
sanctions and blockades. Siegfried (2006) observed that DPRK has a stockpile of about fifty kilograms 
of plutonium, which is sufficient to build eight nuclear bombs prior to the post 2006 nuclear tests 
sanction. 
However, some scholars like Zarate (2009), Rosett (2015), and Dethomas (2016) observe that the 
sanctions were ineffective in aborting the DPRK’s nukes programme because they are inappropriate to 
reverse DPRK’s nuclear programme (Dethomas, 2016). DPRK’s nuclear and missile programmes has 
three great functions, which are regime security, instrument for international negotiations and 
felicitation for economic assistance, and independent source of energy. Consequently, any international 
pressure, programme and/or action that fail to provide trusted alternative security guarantee, alternative 
means of income and source of energy is bound to fail in swaying DPRK to abandon the nuclear and 
missile programmes. 
On these alternative provisions that could influence DPRK, Ruediger (2006) observes that DPRK has 
no trust in international agreements, the United States, and the United Nations. As quoted in Ruediger 
(2006, p. 23, footnote 56), the DPRK Armed Forces Minister-Kim Il Chol—stated: “neither the UN nor 
anybody else can protect us .... one can defend the nation’s dignity and the country’s sovereignty and 
independence only when it has its own powerful strength”. The experiences of Colonel Muamar 
Ghaddafi of Libya who trusted international guarantees and aborted its nuclear weapons programme 
only to be invaded and killed, and President Saddam Hussein of Iraq that complied with international 
resolution and withdrew from Kuwait only to be invaded and killed may have influenced DPRK’s 
stand. 
This argument is supported by the reality of United States long history of aggression, threats, and 
sanctions against DPRK, which are progressively being institutionalised and internationalised. It is not 
a classified policy goal that United States sanctions are designed to bring down DPRK’s regime (Mihm, 
2006). Concurring to this, McCormack (2006) observed: 
“Under the direction of Vice President Dick Cheney, with Undersecretary for Arms Control Bob Joseph 
as coordinator, and in accordance with the national security provisions of the Patriot Act designed for 
the struggle against terrorism, they set out to squeeze North Korea on every front, especially in regard 
to its alleged illegal activities and its human rights record” (p. 2). 
Equally, DPRK has continued to demonstrate its ability to circumvent or bypass US and UN sanctions. 
They always develop new networks and bilateral relations that counter the ones blocked or damaged by 
sanctions. For instance, the difficulties of engaging international exchange and payments in US dollar 
due to the sanctions led DPRK to covert to euros as its medium of international exchange and payment. 
China’s crackdown on trading with DPRK due to sanctions has led DPRK to divert to Russia as major 
trading partner. In addition, DPRK’s trade with others countries such as India, Pakistan, Burkina Faso, 
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Thailand, Iran, Hong Kong, Italy, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines among others increased (see Table 1 
annexed). 
In addition, black economy rosesharply and rapidly in DPRK as a substitute for legal trading and 
exchange concerns as a means of providing for people’s needs. Accordingly, Ruediger (2006, p. 30) 
observed that “North Korea needs hard currency. If sanctions limit the options for earning hard 
currency by legal means, this will change the cost-benefit balance of illegal transactions”. Generally, 
the imposition of US and UN sanctions have only led to trade diversion in DPRK and news 
international alliance with socialist countries and all other countries facing US aggression or threat. In 
all, DPRK’s economy has continued to grow annually at the rate of 3.9% as at 2016 in spite of 
sanctions (Hutt, 2017). 
Further, the nature of the sanctions makes them ineffective in influencing DPRK behaviour change. 
The sanctions were meant to increase the economic and political costs of the nuclear and missile 
programs as well as impede access to outside assistance for developing the nuclear weapons. The 
sanctions were never broad enough or powerful enough to be regime threatening. These types of 
sanctions are insufficient and impotent in stopping the DPRK nuke’s development because the 
programmes are both a constitutional and security agenda. These programmes are managed by a 
military command structure and have attracted substantial investments, which such sanctions cannot 
easily neutralize. This position is countered by the nuclear deterrent regime security school, which 
argues that DPRK pursues the acquisition of nuclear weapon as their top most priority to secure regime 
security. 
 
4. Summary and Recommendation 
The necessity to acquire nuclear capability and achieve military deterrence against the United States 
and its allies led to the development of nuclear weapons and missiles programme in DPRK. This 
projected culminated in multiple bilateral and international sanctions against DPRK with the aim to 
freeze to programme and force the country to negotiating table. Nevertheless, DPRK’s numerous lunch 
and tests of different degrees of missiles capabilities between 2006 and 2017 demonstrate Pyongyang’s 
technological advancement, development and diversification of improved missiles operational 
capabilities stockpile. Its lunch of ICBM and hydrogen bomb in 2017 clearly demonstrate that the 
sanctions failed to achieve both their primary and secondary aims. 
The sanctions failed because virtually all the pre-conditions for efficacious sanctions regime as 
demonstrated by scholars in the literature were lacking or none existing. Although DPRK is relatively 
an under size when compared with the US, Japan, South Korea, and the United nations in general; it 
enjoys considerable economic and political stability, and has being insulated from the sanctions 
protagonists who were its belligerent enemies prior to the sanctions. Economic relations between them 
were either infinitesimal or non-existing prior the sanctions, while DPRK was not an active participant 
in the liberalized international trade. 
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In addition, the sanctions were imposed gradually and were mixed with carrot policies. Initially, the US 
failed to exhibit stringent political will or appetite to enforce penalties on violations even with 
Executive Orders, while DPRK has sufficient capacity to circumvent the sanctions’ regime with strong 
offshore capital. Equally, the sanctions are not targeted against neither do they inflict damages to the 
ruling elites individually. It is observed also that DPRK’s nuclear and missile programmes are 
intertwined with its nationalism, regime and national security. Thus, they are managed by 
constitutionalised hierarchical military structure, which makes it impossible to terminate the 
programme because of the death of any individual or group of individuals in the country. Therefore, the 
alleged plots to assassinate DPRK’s leader by United States, South Korea, and Japan does not 
guarantee the freezing of its nuclear programme. 
It is also pertinent to aver that with the failure of sanctions and DPRK’s acquisition of nuclear 
capabilities and weapons, military campaign shall equally fail. Its costs will be catastrophic and very 
high because millions of lives will be lost, cities on both sides of the divide shall be laid waste while 
the consequences shall hunt humanity for decades. Therefore, the reality of DPRK being a nuclear state 
should be acknowledged and proper international engagement pursued. Precisely, DPRK should be 
integrated into the world system as such due to its power balancing and deterrent posture. 
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Table 1. Exports to DPRK from 2004 to 2012 
countries Pre-Sanctions (2004-2006) Post-Sanctions (2007-2012) 
 HSPC MECR
s 














902214 NSG Apparatus based on 
the use of X-rays 
902214 NSG Apparatus based 






















www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape               Advances in Politics and Economic                      Vol. 1, No. 1, 2018 
26 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
Germany 902730 NSG Spectrometers or 
spectrophotometers
902720 AG Chromatographs 
or electrophoresis 
instruments 
847150 MTCR Data processing 
units 
902710 AG Electronic gas 
analysis apparatus 




















847141 MTCR Data processing 
machines 




Air or gas 
compressors 
870590 MTCR Special purpose 
vehicles 
391721 AG Tubes and pipes 391721 AG Tubes and pipes 
391723 AG Tubes and pipes 391723 AG Tubes and pipes 
690290 MTCR Refractory bricks 621040 AG Garment 
760429 NSG Aluminium bars 
and rods 
841869 AG Refrigerating unit 
850440 NSG Electrical static 
converters 
850440 NSG Electrical static 
841780 AG Industrial or lab 
furnaces 
(incinerator)  
711510 NSG Catalysts in the 
form of wire cloth 





Centrifuges 847989 NSG and 
MTCR 
Machines 
848210 MTCR Ball bearings 841370 NSG Centrifugal 
pumps 
870590 MTCR Special purpose 
vehicles 




Pumps 850590 NSG and 
MTCR 
Electro-magnets  
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Air or gas 
compressors 
853230 NSG Capacitors 
852910 MTCR Aerials and aerial 
reflectors 
847150 MTCR Data processing 
Units  
901480 MTCR Navigational 
instrument 
854320 NSG Electric signal 
generators 
851410 NSG Resistance heated 
furnaces and ovens 








Machines  847989 NSG and 
MTCR 
Machines 
   854239 MTCR Integrated 
electronic circuits 






of stainless steel 













Air or gas 
compressors 
810890 NSG and AG Titanium 
852990 MTCR Parts for 
transmission 
apparatus 




   852990 MTCR Parts for 
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transmission 
apparatus 
   841480 NSG and AG Turbo charger (or 
air or gas 
compressors) 
   902214 NSG Apparatus based 
on the use of 
X-rays 
   841780 AG Industrial or lab 
furnaces 
(incinerator)  
Indonesia 852990 MTCR Parts for 
transmission 
apparatus 










841950 AG Heat exchange units 381512 NSG Reaction initiators 
with 





Machines 842489 MTCR and 
AG 
Mechanical for 
spraying liquids or 
powders 
852610 MTCR Radar apparatus 841850 AG Refrigerating unit 
852990 MTCR Parts for 
transmission 
apparatus 









391721 AG  Tubes and pipes 
   391723 AG  Tubes and pipes 
   844400 MTCR Filament extrusion
machines 
   842230 AG  Machines for 
filling, closing and 
labelling 
 841950 AG  Heat exchange units 841869 AG  Refrigerating unit 
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Japan  
870590 MTCR Special purpose 
vehicles 
   
841869 AG  Refrigerating unit    
841370 NSG Centrifugal pumps    
 
Malaysia  
283711 AG  Sodium cyanides  841480 NSG and AG Air or gas 
compressors 
841950 AG  Heat exchange units 854370 NSG&MTCR Other electrical 
machines 









Air or gas 
compressors 
850440 NSG Electrical static 
converters 






841181 NSG&MTCR Gas turbines  
   847150 MTCR Data processing 
units 
   847141 MTCR Data processing 
machines 
Singapore  841869 AG  Refrigerating unit  847150 MTCR Data processing 
units 
847149 MTCR Automatic data 
processing machine











847130 MTCR Portable automatic 
data processing 
machines 
852580 NSG Digital cameras 
847150 MTCR Data processing 
units 
847130 MTCR Portable automatic 
data 
Processing 
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machines 
292219 AG  Oxygen-function 
amino-compounds 
   
Sri Lanka     401519 AG  Articles of Apparel











845891 NSG Numerically 
controlled lathes 
847141 MTCR Data processing 
machine 
846599 NSG Machine tools for 
processing 
materials 






AC Generators 846019 NSG Flat-surface 
grinding 
machines 
847141 MTCR Data processing 
machines 
280429 NSG Rare gases 
847149 MTCR Automatic data 
processing machine












   
850440 NSG Electrical static 
converters 



















stainless steel  
880390 MTCR Parts of balloons, 
aircrafts, Space 
crafts, and satellites






Machinery, plant or 
laboratory 
equipment 




stainless steel  
852910 MTCR Aerials and aerial 852580 NSG Cameras 
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reflectors 
841850 AG  Refrigerating unit  846593 
NSG 
NSG Grinding, sanding 
or Polishing 
machines 




of stainless steel 








Air or gas 
compressors 
842489 MTCR and 
AG 
Mechanical for 
spraying liquids or 
powders 








401519 AG Articles of apparel 841319 NSG Pumps for liquids 
Source: Hyuk, Kim (nd.). The Impact of United Nations Sanctions on North Korea (DPRK), Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute paper, pp. 109-113. 
